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Abstract: Many aerospace enterprises and other organizations have adopted a variety of management approaches to 
achieve continuous process improvement, enterprise change and transformation, such as the lean enterprise system, 
total quality management (TQM), theory of constraints (TOC), agile manufacturing, and business process re-
engineering (BPR). Among them, the lean enterprise system, with its origins in the Toyota Production System (TPS), 
comes closest to providing a holistic view of enterprises as complex socio-technical systems embodying a mutually 
supportive set of precepts and practices driving enterprise operations at all levels (i.e., strategic, tactical, operational) 
and throughout the enterprise value stream encompassing both upstream supplier networks and downstream customer-
focused activities. Lean enterprise principles and practices have evolved over many decades through a process of 
experimentation, learning and adaptation. A distinction is made between the basic lean enterprise system (BLES), 
capturing salient developments over the period between the late 1940s and mid-1990s, and the contemporary lean 
enterprise system (CLES), capturing major conceptual and implementation-related extensions of the basic model since 
the mid-1990s. The lean enterprise system, as a viable framework for explaining the structure and dynamics of modern 
networked enterprises, for managing them, and for improving their performance through either continuous process 
improvement or planned systemic change and transformation, remains a work-in-progress.  
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1     INTRODUCTION 
The lean enterprise system has been characterized as a new and fundamentally different way of 
thinking about and managing modern industrial enterprises. Its origins can be traced to the 
development of the Japanese auto industry management principles and practices over the decades 
since the late 1940s, based primarily on the evolution of the Toyota production system. Main 
elements of Toyota’s production system, which were deliberately not codified until the 1970s to 
protect its competitive advantage enjoyed through just-in-time production JIT), evolved over time 
through a process of experimentation, learning and adaptation. Principal early attention in the 
West focused on Toyota’s manufacturing and related operations over the period from the late 
1970s to the mid-1990s. Since Toyota has served as the role model for lean production (Womack 
& Jones 1996:150), it is also known as the Toyota Production System (TPS), kanban or just-in-
time (JIT) production system.  
 
A defining feature of the Toyota Production System has been the application of the just-in-time 
production (JIT) concept to manufacturing operations. The just-in-time (JIT) concept has been 
credited by Ohno (1988:75,78) to KiichiroToyoda, the first president of the Toyota Motor 
Company and the son of Sakichi Toyoda, the company’s founder. In a just-in-time (JIT) system, a 
particular downstream production station pulls the right number of needed parts from the 
immediately preceding or earlier upstream station. A coupled idea is that of the kanban or pull-
system, inspired by Ohno’s observation of U.S. supermarkets (Ohno 1988:26-27), which worked 
on the principle that shelves would be regularly restocked as the customer purchased (pulled) 
needed products at the time and in the quantities needed. The just-in-time (JIT) system is enabled 
by the use of kanban cards, serving as a pull-replenishment mechanism sending orders to the 
earlier upstream station.1 Thus, every step in the production process is linked and synchronized as 
a continuous flow process (Ohno 1988:5). The continuous flow production process is managed 
through a build-to-order approach utilizing workload leveling or leveled production (heijunka), 
using takt time, to balance the workflow along the production line and hence to achieve stability. 
Thus, the kanban system and takt time together represent a unique horizontal coordination 
mechanism throughout the enterprise, extending out to the multi-tiered supplier network.  
 
The term lean production was first introduced by Krafcik (1988), a researcher associated with the 
International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP) at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to 
underscore the point that lean uses less of everything compared with mass production. Even 
before the discovery of basic Japanese production methods that later became known as lean 
production, however, their main elements were already known to close observers of Japanese 
management practices (Sugimori et al. 1977; Ohno 1988; Monden 1993; Imai 1986; Shingo 
1989). Lean production concepts were defined, articulated, and brought to the attention of a wider 
audience by Womack, Jones & Roos (1990) in their landmark book, The Machine That Changed 
the World, based on the first five years of research conducted under the auspices of IMVP.  
An international benchmarking survey conducted by the MIT IMVP researchers in the late 1980s 
revealed that Japanese auto producers required roughly one-half the effort required to assemble 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Critics of kanban, as a pull-scheduling system, have pointed out that, even though it may be well suited to 
a high-volume, repetitive, manufacturing environment, it is not the only way of production scheduling, 
particularly in cases of demand variability (Hines, Holwe & Rich 2004:1000).  Also, for several reasons, 
the application of lean production methods by Japanese companies, including the kanban system, has faced 
certain limits (Cusumano 1994).   
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cars compared with their European and American counterparts and the quality of the Japanese-
made cars was, on average, 50 percent better than those made by American-owned plants in the 
United States and about 47 percent better than those produced by European-owned plants in 
Europe (Womack, Jones & Roos 1990:89). These were significant differences that could not be 
dismissed or explained away by attributing them to special Japanese social and cultural 
characteristics. Moreover, Japanese transplant auto production plants in the United States 
outperformed their domestic counterparts. The Toyota-General Motors joint venture, the New 
United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI) plant in California, based on the lean production 
system and employing pretty much the same workforce as before when it was a lagging General 
Motors plant, made a remarkable transformation in a short period of time, reaching the 
productivity levels of Toyota’s own plants in Japan. These results formed the basis for 
designating the observed production system at Toyota and other Japanese auto makers as the lean 
production system, also often described as lean thinking, which has been defined as “a way to do 
more and more with less and less – less human effort, less equipment, less time, and less space – 
while coming closer and closer to providing customers with exactly what they want” (Womack & 
Jones 1996:15). 
Gradually, the scope of the lean production system has been expanded from an almost exclusive 
focus on manufacturing operations to encompass the entire enterprise, from elimination of waste 
to creation of value, from enriching the enterprise’s shareholders to delivering value to its 
multiple stakeholders, from seeking greater operational efficiency to achieving greater enterprise 
flexibility and responsiveness, from focusing largely on the core enterprise to embracing the end-
to-end networked enterprise defining the core enterprise’s total capability space, and from 
continuous process improvement to creation of network-level dynamic organizational 
capabilities. Accordingly, in this article, the term lean enterprise system is used to characterize 
the evolving scope and content of lean principles and practices.  
 
Lean enterprise concepts began to attract widespread attention in the West in late 1980s and early 
1990s at a time of historic change, particularly in the aerospace industry. The end of the Cold 
War and the intensifying international competition in commercial aerospace ushered a radically 
new market environment representing a paradigm shift from performance to affordability. In 
response to the new affordability imperative, the industry went through a prolonged period of 
consolidation, realignment and streamlining of existing operations, involving cycles of mergers 
and acquisitions. Although necessary, this was hardly sufficient. To achieve substantially greater 
efficiency improvements by focusing on process management many firms in the industry began 
to adopt lean enterprise principles and methods – then known under various names like just-in-
time (JIT) manufacturing, lean manufacturing or the Toyota Production System (TPS). More 
broadly, the dissolution of the dominant mass production paradigm catalyzed a major shift in 
management philosophy and practice concentrating on process management and continuous 
improvement.  
A number of other process improvement approaches, as well, gained increasing popularity – 
principally total quality management (TQM), six sigma, theory of constraints (TOC), agile 
manufacturing, and business process reengineering (BPR) -- to boost operational efficiency, 
ensure greater customer satisfaction, and achieve enterprise transformation as a matter of long-
term survival.2 These approaches were advanced as unique and universally applicable best 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This list of process improvement approaches omits the various enterprise performance assessment 
frameworks -- such as the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) system developed by the 
Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, the ISO 9000 standards related to the 
implementation of quality systems as well as the ISO 14000 series of standards related to the 
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solutions to address the prevailing enterprise performance problems impeding their ability to 
achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., waste, poor quality, process variation, lack of 
responsiveness). Among them, the lean enterprise system comes closest to providing a holistic 
view of enterprises embodying a tightly-knit set of highly complementary precepts and practices 
driving their central value-creating operations – product development, manufacturing, supply 
chain management – while optimizing the capabilities and utilization of all people and nurturing a 
culture of continuous organizational learning.  
In recent years, lean enterprise principles and six sigma concepts have been merged in practice 
into a unified implementation approach, generally known as lean six sigma or as lean six sigma 
(LSS) continuous process improvement (CPI) toolset customized to address particular needs. 
Many aerospace companies have adopted various combinations of these and other methods, often 
under different titles (e.g., Lockheed Martin’s LM21 lean transformation initiative, Boeing’s 
Lean+ initiative, Raytheon’s Six SigmaTM Process, Pratt & Whitney’s Achieving Competitive 
Excellence (ACE) operating system). The main motivation has been to leverage the respective 
strengths of lean concepts (i.e., elimination of waste, speed of process flow), six sigma methods 
(i.e., virtually perfect quality) and related initiatives to help accelerate enterprise improvement 
and transformation efforts. Even though initially positioned as competing approaches to 
accomplish the same end results and choosing one meant the exclusion of others, in fact they each 
offer key features that can be combined to minimize their respective weaknesses and maximize 
the synergy among them. 
This chapter focuses on the evolution of the lean enterprise system, by tracing its development 
since the late 1940s to the present. The goal of the chapter is to provide a unified contemporary 
review, interpretation and synthesis of the lean enterprise system, to highlight its evolving 
conceptual properties as well as to help managers make informed decisions in their enterprise 
change and transformation efforts. To understand the evolving nature of lean ideas, a distinction 
is made between the basic lean enterprise system (BLES) and the contemporary lean enterprise 
system (CLES). The basic lean enterprise system (BLES) captures the development of lean 
enterprise principles and practices over roughly the period from the late 1940s to the mid-1990s. 
The dominant ideas took shape during the postwar decades and were documented mostly in the 
1970s through the mid-1990s. The contemporary lean enterprise system (CLES) captures key 
conceptual and implementation-related expansions of the basic model since the mid-1990s. Core 
lean enterprise ideas have been significantly expanded conceptually in light of contemporary 
theory and reality, with a heavy concentration on the transformation of the aerospace industry 
since the early 1990s, mostly through research conducted under the auspices of the Lean 
Advancement Initiative at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).3 The contemporary 
system embodies and builds upon the central features of the basic system. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
implementation of environmental management systems, and the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award 
criteria for manufacturing excellence. These frameworks or methods are typically used to gauge 
compliance with defined practices or standards of performance, progress towards pre-defined levels of 
capability achievement, or levels of excellence. They do not represent planned enterprise performance 
improvement models or frameworks, even though it might be argued that the implementation of the defined 
practices and metrics at various maturity levels could well propel an enterprise to a higher maturity level, 
marking a higher level of performance.  
                                                                                                       
3 The program was launched in 1993 as the Lean Aircraft Initiative (LAI), a consortium of government 
agencies led by the U.S. Air Force, major defense aircraft companies, national labor organizations, and 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The central purpose of LAI was to help achieve greater 
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Building on this chapter, the next, companion, chapter is devoted to an integrated discussion of 
the lean enterprise system, total quality management (TQM), and six sigma, which together share 
a common historical heritage, embrace critical common elements, and represent mutually 
supportive approaches. The broader goal is to help evolve an integrated management system that 
brings together the highly complementary elements of the various methods to maximize their 
combined strength and help managers improve their chances of success in planning and 
implementing enterprise change and transformation. 
Following this introductory section, the next two sections provide an overview of the evolution of 
the lean enterprise system by focusing, respectively, on the basic lean enterprise system (BLES) 
and the contemporary lean enterprise system (CLES). A summary comparative review of the key 
features of the two lean enterprise systems is then presented. Finally, a number of concluding 
observations are offered to summarize main findings, highlight major conceptual issues that 
remain to be addressed, underscore a number of implementation-related lessons learned, and 
outline future perspectives.   
Throughout the chapter, the terms organization and enterprise are used interchangeably, with a 
clear preference for the latter to highlight emerging organizational forms (e.g., network 
organization, virtual corporation, boundaryless company) at multiple scales of complexity (e.g., 
program enterprise, company division, multidivisional corporation, government agency -- with 
their associated networks of supporting organizations) and embracing a spectrum of 
organizational configurations ranging from vertically-integrated firms to relatively flat 
organizational networks.4  
For rough comparability between the two sections below focusing on the basic enterprise system 
BLES) and the contemporary lean enterprise system (CLES), the discussion is organized around a 
number of discrete dimensions to draw attention to their main characteristics: goal (main purpose, 
objective, expected outcome sought through the adoption of lean principles and methods); 
background (origins, defining features); core concepts (main organizing ideas, underlying 
mental model, cause-effect relationships, posited internal and external enterprise context driving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
affordability in the development, production, and lifecycle operations and sustainment of defense systems. 
The program was renamed Lean Aerospace Initiative in 1996, with the addition of both the defense and 
commercial space sector, and the commercial aircraft industry, into the program. The program’s scope was 
further expanded in 2007, when it was renamed Lean Advancement Initiative to broaden its research and 
implementation thrust to encompass both aerospace and non-aerospace organizations. The program’s main 
objectives are to: (a) enable enterprises to create value for their multiple stakeholders effectively, efficiently 
and reliably in a complex and rapidly changing environment; (b) enable focused and accelerated 
transformation of complex enterprises through the collaborative engagement of all stakeholders in industry, 
government and academia; and, (c) understand, develop, and institutionalize research-driven principles, 
processes, behaviors and tools. For more information, refer to the LAI website http://web.mit.edu/lean.  
 
4 In aerospace, for example, large system-integrators or prime contractors are typically supported by 
complex multi-tiered supplier networks, where as much as 60%-80% of the total cost of aerospace systems 
consists of the materials and parts, components, and subsystems provided by the suppliers. Many of the 
first-tier suppliers or subcontractors are large companies (e.g., Rockwell-Collins, Honeywell, Raytheon, 
Northrop Grumman) with multiple products, simultaneously engaged in networked relationships with 
multiple system-integrators or prime contractors (e.g., Boeing, Airbus, Lockheed Martin). The idea of 
complex large-scale networked organizations is thus beginning to displace the traditional emphasis on 
individual organizations as the basic unit of analysis.  
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required change); focus (scale, scope and content of targeted change); and implementation 
(change strategy and practices; process and execution of planned change; tools and methods; role 
of leadership and workers; timing, sequence, pace and type of expected change). Since a 
substantial volume of literature already exists on various aspects of the lean enterprise system, the 
discussion presented below is highly compressed, favoring selectivity over comprehensiveness. In 
particular, the discussion below builds on and extends a review of the evolution of the lean 
enterprise system given in Murman et al. (2002:87-116). 
2     BASIC LEAN ENTERPRISE SYSTEM (BLES) 
2.1    Goal  
According to Taiichi Ohno, who is recognized as the main architect of the Toyota Production 
System (Monden 1993:53; Fujimoto 1999:26), the most important objective of the Toyota 
Production System (TPS), as an enterprise, is to increase production efficiency by “consistently 
and thoroughly eliminating waste” (Ohno 1988:xiii). According to Monden (1993:1), the ultimate 
goal was profit, to be achieved primarily through cost reduction or improving productivity by 
eliminating waste.  
2.2   Background 
The basic lean enterprise system (BLES) embodies the central attributes of the Toyota Production 
System (TPS), as it has been documented in the literature (e.g., Ohno 1988; Monden 1993; 
Shingo 1989; Womack, Jones & Roos 1990; Womack & Jones 1996; Liker 2004). The roots of 
key ideas inherent in the basic system can be traced to the most inauspicious circumstances in 
which Japan found itself following World War II: a small and fragmented domestic market, small 
and depleted workforce, scarce natural resources, and little investment capital. The Fordist 
moving assembly-line mass production system represented the most efficient prevailing way of 
producing cars through the achievement of significant scale economies. This was made possible 
by high-volume, large-lot production of standardized parts through dedicated production 
processes and highly specialized tasks. However, under the prevailing circumstances, “mass 
production could never work in Japan” (Womack, Jones & Roos 1990:49) and, besides, Japan’s 
fledgling auto industry had to find some way of withstanding the Western mass production giants 
poised to enter the Japanese market. The challenge was how to design a new production system 
that could simultaneously provide a greater variety of low-cost and high-quality products to meet 
diverse and varying customer needs in a highly fragmented domestic market in an environment of 
intense domestic competition, where such a new production system would be both more efficient 
and more flexible than the prevalent mass production system. The lean production system 
emerged in this most inhospitable environment as a coherent competitive response to mass 
production. 
2.3     Core concepts  
The basic lean system is not a list of “good” things to do, a toolset, a set of implementation 
techniques, or some multi-step implementation process. It is driven not by theory-based deductive 
thinking or postulates extracted from textbooks but rather by a process of experimentation, 
learning and adaptation. Lean principles emerged through practice and were later discovered, 
codified and extended by scholars and others. The uniqueness of the basic lean enterprise system 
(BLES) derives not from any of its individual elements but rather from having all the elements 
working together as a system (Liker 2004:xv).  
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Mirroring Toyota’s experience, the basic lean enterprise system (BLES) reflects a management 
philosophy that values stability and constancy of purpose focusing on long-term rather than short-
term results, delivering value to the customer, enhancing the capabilities of all people, elimination 
of waste, continuous improvement, and establishing long-term collaborative relationships based 
on mutual trust and commitment. Workers are treated not as a cost factor to be cut but as the main 
source of ideas for eliminating waste and achieving continuous improvement. Profit is seen not as 
unit cost plus profit but as the selling price, largely defined by the market, minus unit cost, which 
is under the enterprise’s control.  
As a production system, the basic lean model represents an interconnected set of highly 
complementary, mutually-positively-reinforcing organizing principles working together as a 
system. These interrelated core principles encompass the following:  
Customer focus. The starting point is focusing on the customer, to produce the product the 
customer wants at the right price, at the right time, and to deliver the quality valued by the 
customer. Customer needs and expectations act as a pull on all enterprise activities, representing 
the “true north,” providing orientation for the entire enterprise.  
Elimination of waste. In order to make products that the customer values, all forms of waste 
(muda) must be eliminated.5 Ohno (1988:95) saw “complete elimination of waste” as the basis of 
the Toyota Production System. Elimination of waste not only reduces cost but also shortens cycle 
time (e.g., production, product development), in particular the order-to-cash cycle time – the 
elapsed time from the moment the customer places an order to the point when the company 
collects the cash (Ohno 1988:ix). It is far more important to remove non-value adding activities, 
which saves time, than to speed up the production process by driving it faster. 
Continuous flow. Continuous flow entails ensuring that only the right parts reach the assembly 
line at the right time they are needed and only in the amount needed, with no defects. This means, 
in the limit, single-piece flow (i.e., make one and move one) or stockless production virtually 
eliminating inventories of raw materials, work-in-process inventories or finished products, with 
minimal travel or movement between operations. Creating continuous flow requires, before 
anything else, careful sequencing of all essential work steps and work standardization (Ohno 
1988:130). It also involves the application of a number of methods of workplace organization.6 
The primary challenge is to discard the batch-and-queue mentality and install a single-piece flow 
system. Flow is best achieved by discarding traditional functional organizations and by replacing 
them with integrated product teams organized along the value stream.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Chief sources of waste include overproduction, defects, waiting, underutilization of the capabilities of 
workers, transportation, inventory, motion, and excess processing. Each activity, action or step in the 
production process, either directly contributing to it or enabling it, is classified into one of the following 
categories: (a) it unambiguously creates value; (b) it creates no value but it is unavoidable given the current 
capabilities within the company; and (c) it creates no value and can be eliminated immediately. Actions in 
categories (a) and (b) are analyzed further through the use of value engineering, in an effort to improve the 
action as much as possible, eliminating unnecessary expenditures of resources. See Ohno (1988:57-58). 
 
 
6 These include visual controls (e.g., andon lights, kanban cards; color-coded delineation of tools and work 
spaces), 5S (i.e., sort, straighten, shine, standardize, sustain), cellular manufacturing, and point-of-use 
storage (POUS), involving direct delivery of materials and parts to specific work stations where they are 
used.  
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Perfect quality. Striving for perfect first-time quality is absolutely essential for the realization of 
continuous flow. This means materials and information flow from one station to the next, but 
defects do not flow by design, since defects represent rework, a major source of waste. Besides 
enabling continuous flow, of course, striving for perfect quality is inextricably linked to achieving 
absolute safety. Toyota’s basic rule, in fact, has been safety first, followed by quality. Continuous 
flow would be virtually impossible without striving for perfect first-time quality, which permeates 
all activities throughout the enterprise and embraces all phases of the product life cycle from 
product development to production, sales and customer support services. This is enabled through 
the use of many of the methods associated with total quality management (TQM).7 
Flexibility and responsiveness. Achieving flexibility and responsiveness strongly complements 
the other principles and amplifies their cumulative impact in terms of both greater efficiency and 
effectiveness. This is made possible through three important, closely related, innovations: small 
lot production, radically reducing setup times, and developing a multi-skilled workforce through 
intensive training and education, where a given worker could perform multiple tasks. 
Dramatically reducing the set-up time, from many hours to minutes, accomplished by Shingo, the 
creator of the “single minute change of dies” (SMED), was a significant competitive step forward 
for Toyota (Shingo 1989).  
Collaborative relationships. In the lean enterprise, traditional arm’s length, adversarial, short-
term, transaction-based relationships are replaced by collaborative relationships, both internally 
and externally. Internally, the role of managers is to coach workers, help them solve problems, 
and nurture group and organizational learning in a teamwork environment. Externally, the 
principal or central firm (assembler) has collaborative relationships with its suppliers, based on 
mutual trust and reciprocal obligations, involving joint determination of prices, continuous cost 
reduction, information sharing, and joint problem solving. The multi-tiered supplier network 
essentially represents an extension of the core (assembler) enterprise, where assembler and its 
suppliers typically work together under a long-term cooperative agreement over the life of the 
product. Suppliers are selected on the basis of past relationships and a proven record of 
performance rather than on the basis of competitive bids. The relationships, involving not 
adversarial bargaining but synergistic problem solving, are managed in an environment of 
transparency and established ground rules promoting fair play and avoiding opportunistic 
behavior.  
A relatively small number of first-tier suppliers are given greater responsibility and are integrated 
early into the design process. While dual sourcing is often practiced to stimulate competition 
among suppliers, close relationships are maintained with individual suppliers. Selected first-tier 
suppliers are further given the responsibility for managing their own lower-tier suppliers, acting 
on behalf of the assembler, through a clustered control structure, employing fair play and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
7 For example, quality is designed into the product at the very outset rather than “inspected in” later in the 
process. Other well-known methods include poka-yoke (error-proofing), quality circles, team-based 
problem solving, quality-at-the-source, root cause analysis (e.g., 5whys), preventive maintenance, and 
employee suggestion systems. The production line is stopped to fix problems at the source when and where 
they occur. In addition, a sophisticated strategy of automation is employed to maximize the capabilities of 
both workers and machines to achieve “automatic control of defects,” which is known as autonomation 
(jidoka) or automation with a human touch. The main idea is to have machines that can prevent defective 
parts from being produced. The origin of the idea is traced to Sakichi Toyoda, the founder of Toyota, who 
earlier had invented an auto-activated weaving machine where the “loom stopped instantly if any one of the 
warp or weft threads broke” (Ohno 1988:6) 
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mutually-beneficial relationships. Important practices include the use of target prices, 
performance monitoring, competition, asset-specific investments, cross-equity ownership, mutual 
dependence, and pursuing differentiated strategies for suppliers occupying different niches. 
Suppliers deliver components directly to the assembly line, just-in-time -- through small, frequent 
deliveries so that there is continuous flow of parts -- with no prior incoming inspection. The 
assembler and its suppliers work together to trace a defective part to its ultimate source, in the 
rare event that such problems arise. Supplier associations provide an on-going institutional 
mechanism for information sharing and technology transfer, for instance involving statistical 
process control (SPC) and quality assurance (Smitka 1991:17-22;135-174; Nishiguchi 1994:6-7); 
Womack, Jones & Roos 1990:60; Murman et al. 2002:104). 
Continuous improvement. Continuous improvement (kaizen) means on-going incremental 
improvement based on knowledge. It involves process-oriented thinking and problem solving 
through teamwork, employing a wide array of practices, methods and tools (e.g., quality at the 
source, quality circles, 5whys, total productive maintenance, suggestion system). An important 
enabler is the Deming Cycle or Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle. Also a key enabler is having a 
multi-skilled workforce, giving workers many educational opportunities, and teamwork. 
Continuous improvement serves as the mechanism that ties together all of the lean enterprise 
principles and fundamentally represents a complex evolutionary process of learning-by-doing and 
organizational capability building.  
Continuous improvement reflects a basic Toyota tenet that serious learning results from action in 
the gemba, or the real place where the work gets done and customer-satisfying value is created, 
resulting in the product or service that enables the company to survive and prosper. Existing 
engineering, process and work standards are strictly maintained, while at the same time they are 
improved on an on-going basis through kaizen to reduce cost, improve quality, and increase 
customer satisfaction by pursuing an incremental, gradual, improvement process. Kaizen involves 
everyone, managers and workers alike. Learning is synonymous with doing. Accordingly, in 
striving to build a learning organization, management empowers workers “to learn by practicing 
and doing, being physically involved, using hands as well as their brains” (Imai 1997: 89). The 
learning experiences in the gemba, leading to continuous improvement, reflect an appreciation of 
fundamental human values. Improvement is not a top-down dictum but a way of life, a source of 
pride in one’s work, a means of personal fulfillment and growth. In the gemba, improvement is 
both top-down and bottom-up, where the management’s role is “to help gemba do a better job by 
reducing constraints as much as possible” (Imai 1997:13-15).  
These principles, and the clusters of activities and practices they embrace, create significant 
complementarities at the strategic, tactical and operational levels. This means that if the 
performance levels for a specific set of activities are improved incrementally by employing a 
given principle, then the performance levels associated with all other activities driven by the 
application of other principles will also rise incrementally. In other words, both direct (first-order) 
and indirect (second-order) interaction effects will be positive. As a result, if the marginal costs 
associated with some activities fall as a result of the realized positive direct and indirect effects, 
then it will be optimal for the enterprise to pursue all of the principles and associated activities 
together (Milgrom & Roberts 1990).  
 
2.4    Focus  
The basic lean enterprise system (BLES) has focused primarily on factory floor operations and 
only gradually expanded its scope to encompass the supplier network. The center of attention has 
been the development, management and continuous improvement of a customer-focused, pull-
based, small-lot production system designed to provide a variety of low-cost and high-quality 
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products to meet diverse customer needs. A high level of efficiency is achieved at both a high-
volume and low-volume production rate. The factory workflow process is designed to ensure 
continuous flow pulled by customer demand and enabled by just-in-time (JIT) production, which, 
in turn, is made possible by creating virtually defect free products and processes, with respect for 
people squarely at the center of the entire system. Relentless pursuit of continuous improvement 
places central emphasis on elimination of waste, by making optimal use of the capabilities of 
people, which ensures not only greater efficiency but also delivery of superior products to the 
customer.  
The enterprise, as a manufacturing system, encompasses production, product development, and 
procurement or managing supplier networks (Fujimoto 1999:321), with central emphasis on the 
design and management of the enterprise’s manufacturing-related operations. Womack & Jones 
(1994:93) envision a lean enterprise as “a group of individuals, functions, and legally separate 
but operationally synchronized companies,” where “[T]he notion of the value stream defines the 
lean enterprise.” An enterprise’s value stream is defined, for each specific product the enterprise 
produces, as the chain of processes, activities and webs of companies involved in creating and 
delivering value to the enterprise’s customers. In its most expansive form, the value stream 
covers the “entire set of activities entailed in creating and producing a specific product, from 
concept through detailed design to actual availability, from the initial sale through order entry and 
production scheduling to delivery, and from raw materials produced far away and out of sight 
right into the hands of the customer,” where the organizational mechanism for making all this 
happen is called the lean enterprise (Womack & Jones 1996:20-21).  
2.5    Implementation 
The basic system has been reformulated, streamlined and popularized by Womack & Jones 
(1996) in a way that is easy to understand and implement across many industries, stressing the 
“how-to” aspects of working towards creating lean enterprises. Value stream mapping is used to 
identify all the specific activities occurring along a value stream for a product or family of 
products to develop a visual understanding of the flow of materials and information along the 
value stream (Womack & Jones 1996: 37-38, 311). 
This reformulation defines a five-step process for converting muda (waste) into value:   
(a) Value: The first step is to specify value as defined by the end customer. Value is defined in 
terms of the specific products and services having specific capabilities offered at specific prices to 
specific customers.  
(b) Value stream: Mapping the value stream for each product provides a basis for performing an 
in-depth analysis of each of the individual activities in the value stream in order to identify and 
eliminate all non-value adding activities.   
(c) Flow: Once the non-value-adding or wasteful activities along the value stream have been 
eliminated to the maximum extent possible, the next step is to make the remaining, value-creating 
steps “flow” continuously.  
(d) Pull: Conceptually, the customer “pulls” the product from the enterprise rather than the 
enterprise pushing the product onto the customer. This “pulling” action triggers a cascade of 
production actions throughout the upstream supplier network.  
(e) Perfection: Companies that have implemented lean principles and practices find that there is 
no end to the process of reducing waste and continually improving the product and service 
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delivered to the customer. Consequently, the pursuit of perfection entails a continuous process of 
improvement.   
In this reformulation, a critical point is the crystallization of the focus on customer-pulled value, 
or the delivery of a product or service that is valued by the customer, to signal a shift away from 
the pursuit of cost reduction through elimination of waste as the central objective. Thus, the goal 
of the enterprise is defined not as the absence of waste, but as the delivery of customer-perceived 
value. What, then, is the relationship between customer-perceived value and cost? The answer 
provided by Womack & Jones (1996:35-36) is that customer-perceived value is delivered at 
muda-free unit cost, which exactly corresponds to target cost driving production operations.  
However, the precise meaning of muda-free unit cost or target cost remains obscure in light of 
standard microeconomic theory of firm behavior under alternative conditions of market structure. 
Also, muda-free unit cost or target cost, defining the (minimum) unit cost at which customer-
perceived value is delivered, means that the customer is the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes 
muda and what does not (Hines, Holwe & Rich 2004:997). The conceptual basis of such an idea 
is questionable.8  
The work of Womack & Jones (1996), in addition to its contribution to a wider dissemination of 
lean ideas, has also elevated the concept of the value stream into the lean lexicon – a borrowing 
and broadening of the idea of the value chain introduced earlier in the literature.  
3    CONTEMPORARY LEAN ENTERPRISE SYSTEM (CLES) 
3.1   Goal 
The basic goal of the enterprise, as conceived by contemporary lean enterprise system (CLES), is 
the creation of value for multiple enterprise stakeholders. This is generally seen to underwrite an 
enterprise’s overall success. Traditional measures of enterprise success (e.g., larger market share, 
lower costs, improved customer satisfaction, increased profitability, higher return to shareholders) 
are generally seen to reflect various, more specific, aspects or dimensions of the value creation 
concept.  
3.2   Background  
The basic lean enterprise system (BLES) has been extended substantially since the mid-1990s 
beyond its auto industry heritage, in part through research conducted under the auspices of the 
Lean Advancement Initiative (LAI) at MIT. Murman et al. (2002) provide a detailed discussion 
of salient recent conceptual and implementation-related developments, including an updated 
review and discussion of lean enterprise principles, by drawing on the MIT-LAI research. As part 
of its overall research agenda since 1993, the Lean Advancement Initiative has developed a 
family of frameworks, methods and tools for the deployment of lean principles at the enterprise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The notion of muda-free unit cost or target cost, which would have to be set by the producer ahead of 
time, would seem to argue that customer’s preferences are already known with certainty and that improving 
cost, quality and delivery would deliver greater value to the customer. At least implicitly, it does not allow 
for a tradeoff between potential alternative bundles of utility (e.g., new product attributes, brand name, 
environmentally-friendly attributes) the customer may value and the incremental (marginal) costs of 
providing to the customer products or services embodying such alternative bundles of utility. More 
seriously, it would seem to argue that the firm should not invest in exploring the development of new 
technologies, products and services in the future, since this would deliver no value to today’s customer.  
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level, as summarized by Nightingale (2009). The emerging high-resolution picture of the lean 
enterprise, while still drawing upon Toyota’s evolving experience, incorporates new insights and 
perspectives grounded in a wider contemporary understanding of the structure and dynamics of 
complex large-scale networked enterprises, such as those in the aerospace industry.  
 
3.3   Core concepts  
 
The contemporary lean enterprise system (CLES) takes a holistic view of the end-to-end 
networked enterprise as a complex system, encompassing all enterprise functions and operations 
– core values, business system, strategy, capabilities, operations – and focusing on enterprise 
architecture, design and transformation. Lean thinking is defined as “the dynamic knowledge-
driven and customer-focused process by which all people in a defined enterprise continuously 
eliminate waste with the goal of creating value” (Murman et al. 2002:90). This is in sharp 
contrast with the earlier view that the lean enterprise is focused exclusively on the customer and 
is primarily concerned with the elimination of waste.  
 
There have taken place three major developments that define the basic contours of the 
contemporary lean enterprise system (CLES), which together represent a distinct further 
evolution of lean concepts beyond the basic lean enterprise system (BLES): (1) a conceptual 
reorientation and broadening of the goal of the traditional lean system, placing central emphasis 
on value creation for multiple enterprise stakeholders; (2) a fundamental reinterpretation of the 
major thrust of basic lean system, stressing the critical importance of developing an evolutionary 
learning capability towards the creation of dynamic long-term network-level organizational 
capabilities as the major source of sustained competitive advantage; and (3) important further 
interrelated refinements and elaborations of key aspects of the basic lean system, concentrating 
primarily on integrated product development, manufacturing and supply chain management, 
which reinforce and strengthen the previous two major developments.  
 
These three developments represent highly complementary extensions of the conceptual scope of 
basic lean enterprise system (BLES). The first defines the evolving vision and nature of the lean 
enterprise as a networked system with multiple stakeholders, while the latter two represent 
substantive theoretical expansions and refinements of the earlier basic lean model in directions 
more closely aligned with the growing body of academic literature, which identifies organizational 
learning and building dynamic organizational capabilities as the key source of competitive 
advantage. 
 
Value creation for multiple stakeholders. Reflecting both a shift in, and a further refinement of, an 
enterprise’s main goal, a lean enterprise has been defined as “an integrated entity that efficiently 
creates value for its multiple stakeholders by employing lean principles and practices” (Murman et 
al. 2002:144). In this definition, the idea of “elimination of waste to deliver customer-pulled value” 
is essentially replaced by “elimination of waste towards the objective of delivering value to 
multiple enterprise stakeholders.” Stakeholders encompass any individuals or groups who can 
affect, or are affected by, the enterprise’s achievement of its objectives. The concepts of value and 
value creation are also given particular meaning. Value is defined in the context of an exchange 
between the enterprise and its stakeholders, where value means utility or worth accruing to 
stakeholders as a result of the enterprise’s activities in return for the resource contributions they 
have made. Thus, value refers to the “particular worth, utility, benefit, or reward” the stakeholders 
derive in return for their respective contributions, where the level, nature and dimensions of value 
may change over time as the stakeholders’ time horizons, preferences, priorities and willingness to 
pay evolve over time (Murman et al. 2002:178-179).  
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In order for the enterprise to create and deliver value to all stakeholders, it must not only do the job 
right but also do the right job (Murman et al. 2002:177). This suggests that doing the job right 
through continuous improvement is necessary but not sufficient. The enterprise must also be able to 
do the right job. The notions of doing the job right and doing the right job are brought together in a 
value creation framework, which consists of three interrelated components: value identification, 
involving the identification of the stakeholders and their value needs or requirements; value 
proposition, entailing the definition of the terms under which value exchanges among the 
stakeholders can take place and the structuring of the enterprise’s value stream to ensure the 
realization of the promised value exchanges; and value delivery, encompassing the actual 
performance of all functions and processes throughout the enterprise’s value stream in order to 
convey to all stakeholders the promised benefits in accordance with the value exchanges embodied 
in the value proposition (Murman et al. 2002:183).9  
 
New and broader organizing principles are offered to guide the effort of lean enterprises to create 
value for all of their stakeholders by adopting and implementing the value creation framework. 
These principles are: (a) create lean value by doing the job right and by doing the right job; (b) 
deliver value only after identifying stakeholder value and constructing robust value propositions; 
(c) fully realize lean value by adopting an enterprise perspective; (d) address the 
interdependencies across enterprise levels to increase lean value; and (e) people, not just 
processes, effectuate lean value (Murman et al. 2002:281-289). 
 
Developing evolutionary learning capability towards the creation of dynamic long-term 
network-level organizational capabilities. Evolutionary learning capability is a firm-specific 
ability to learn through multiple paths, or through any path, such as learning from what is already 
known, experimentation, finding workable solutions ahead of the competitors, or learning from 
the experiences of others. It is different from, and broader than, routinized learning capability, 
which enables organizational learning or building manufacturing capability through regular 
patterns of learning (e.g., problem-solving routines), learning from repetitive operations (e.g., 
learning by doing), or deliberate learning (e.g., planned searches for alternative courses of action). 
Unlike routinized learning capability, dealing with repetitive and regular patterns of change 
within the existing system, evolutionary learning capability pertains to shaping “higher order 
system changes that themselves are rather irregular and infrequent, and are often connected with 
rare, episodic and unique historical events” (Fujimoto 1999:20).  
 
As documented by Fujimoto (1999), Toyota’s evolutionary path has not been paved by perfect 
foresight, planning and rational action that has deterministically shaped all future outcomes. That 
is, the process underlying Toyota’s rise to competitive prominence has not been driven by 
rational intention to gain competitive advantage. Instead, the company’s growth and change over 
time has been the result of a combination of both intended and unintended developments flowing 
from what might have been initially considered as rational decisions. The company’s evolution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although identified and discussed sequentially, in reality all three phases of the proposed value creation 
framework are closely coupled and highly interactive. The framework suggests that excessive focus on 
delivering value to the end user or any other single stakeholder group can result in dysfunctional value 
streams that tend to ignore other stakeholders. That is, value creation, as defined here, differs from the 
traditional, and narrower, view of the basic lean system concentrating on delivering value – economic 
utility, worth or satisfaction – to the customer. Further, exclusive focus on making value delivery efficient 
spells a trap by inviting ever-increasing attention to elimination of waste, paving the way for an anorexic 
lean enterprise rather than a robust and thriving one.  See Murman et al. (2002: 177-189). 
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has involved both successes and mistakes. However, over time, the company has gradually and 
cumulatively developed a capability for evolutionary learning – a certain kind of ability to evolve 
dynamic organizational capability -- that has enabled it to cope with a complex historical process 
that was, before the fact, neither predictable nor controllable.   
 
To ensure long-term success, an enterprise’s skill at organizational learning and knowledge 
creation, leading to the creation of an evolutionary learning capability, is far more important than 
mastering such narrower skills as excellence in manufacturing, closely-knit relationships with 
suppliers, or similar management practices, where the latter strongly enable the former. A 
common challenge is how to resolve the apparent paradox between rigid work specifications that 
are necessary -- especially in aerospace enterprises that must be absolutely fault-intolerant 
consistent with their safety concerns and must, therefore, exercise tight control on their processes 
-- and the need for continuous organizational learning. Toyota appears to have resolved this 
apparent paradox through its institutionalization of the scientific method, driving continuous 
experimentation and rigorous problem solving (Spear & Bowen 1999).  
 
Other lessons for aerospace enterprises have become available from the experience of Toyota and 
other Japanese auto companies, such as Honda, which have further developed network-wide 
knowledge-sharing practices fostering superior inter-organizational learning. Toyota, in 
particular, has been able to create a highly interconnected learning network with clear rules, in 
which the participating members openly share knowledge, where free riding by anyone is 
prevented, and both explicit (codified) and tacit (uncodified) knowledge is efficiently transferred 
across the network. This experience demonstrates that a network of enterprises working together 
collaboratively can be more effective than a single firm, or a focal firm with arms length 
relationships with its suppliers, in creating, transferring and using knowledge. The reason is that  
there is greater diversity of knowledge that can be tapped within a network than in a given firm or 
in a focal firm that has adversarial supplier relationships. However, it should also be recognized 
that while creating such a collaborative supplier network is well-suited for exploiting the existing 
diversified knowledge across the supplier network, it is much less effective at generating new 
capabilities since the diversity of knowledge in the network will diminish over time as firms in 
the network become increasingly alike by adopting existing tacit knowledge from others (Dyer & 
Nobeoka 2000).  
 
Integration of product development, manufacturing, and supply chain management 
capabilities. Today, the key practice of concurrent engineering -- the practice of simultaneously 
designing both the product and the manufacturing process for building it through the adoption of 
an integrated product and process development (IPPD) process, using integrated product teams 
(IPTs) – is widely understood and used, particularly in the aerospace industry, since its 
introduction into the F-22 Raptor program in the early 1990s. The benefits include substantial 
reductions in cycle time and cost, and improvements in quality. Concurrent engineering entails a 
cross-functional approach, often involving the participation of suppliers. It is generally 
implemented through an overlapping process involving simultaneous product and process 
engineering, deployment of cross-functional teams, early supplier integration into the design 
process, and delegation of greater responsibility to suppliers in designing and developing new 
products (Clark & Fujimoto 1991). The aerospace industry has widely embraced these emerging 
lean enterprise practices. In the F-35 Lightning II Joint Striker Fighter (JSF) acquisition program, 
in which Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor, the air vehicle IPT has been led by a 
collocated employee of Northrop Grumman, which, along with BAE Systems, forms the core 
program team working closely with Lockheed Martin.  
 
KB_eae371_FINAL_v9.docx 
7/31/10 12:59 PM 
15	  
An important development beyond concurrent engineering has been the development of design 
strategies and cross-platform product development approaches. Toyota and other leading 
companies have made further progress in product development by shifting their thinking from 
efficient management of single projects to multi-project management involving platform sharing. 
It has been found that projects employing concurrent technology transfer across different product 
platforms are, by far, the most efficient, measured in terms of engineering hours required 
(Cusumano & Nobeoka 1998).10 The important lesson drawn from this research is that efficient 
management of a single project at a time is no longer sufficient for companies to ensure their 
success in an increasingly competitive global market environment. Moving in this direction, 
aerospace enterprises have increasingly stressed subsystem commonality across multiple 
platforms.         
 
Finally, important lessons from the auto industry in supply chain design and management have 
become increasingly recognized by aerospace enterprises, based on earlier findings that 
delegating greater design responsibility to key suppliers has represented a significant source of 
the competitive advantage built by the Japanese auto companies. That is, an important lean 
practice is to integrate key suppliers into the design and development process: they participate 
early in designing new products, assume significant design responsibility, have strong 
communication links with their customers, and are involved in joint problem solving tasks (Clark 
1989; Clark & Fujimoto 1991). Significant features of closely-knit customer-supplier networks 
include the formation of long-term supplier partnerships and strategic alliances and often involve 
collaborative problem solving, information-sharing, cost-sharing, and risk-sharing relationships 
fostering continuous inter-organizational learning. A key development has been, for a core or 
focal enterprise, to expand its technology and knowledge base through early supplier integration 
into the product development process. 
 
In the aerospace context, it is shown that having database commonality across the supplier 
network in the defense aerospace industry helps to control cost overruns in defense acquisition 
programs (Hoult 1997). Related research demonstrates that early supplier integration into design 
and development in defense aerospace is a key enabler of architectural innovation in new product 
development (Bozdogan, et al., 1998), where architectural innovation is defined as a major 
modification of how components in a product or system are linked together by proactively 
leveraging and integrating the existing technology base of the supplier network (key suppliers, 
tooling suppliers, subtiers) early in the product development process. The results, based on case 
studies, indicate that architectural innovation can yield significant benefits in terms of lower cost, 
shorter cycle time and higher quality, made possible through early supplier integration into 
design.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 These efficiency gains stem from being able to reuse technology from a base project in another project, 
sharing tasks across different projects, and being able to make mutual adjustments in performing the design 
tasks on different projects. Also, using concurrent engineering enables firms to avoid wasted or redundant 
work across multiple platforms. Part of the explanation for the superiority of concurrent engineering across 
overlapping projects is the ability to coordinate projects and to make design adjustments as the projects 
move along, thus avoiding costly subsequent rework. Further, it is found that concurrent technology 
transfer enables firms to improve their overall market performance, by quickly diffusing new technologies 
across multiple product platforms. Moreover, concurrent technology transfer, through the overlapping and 
coordination of tasks across multiple platforms, enables the sharing of key components and helps 
differentiate end products. See Cusumano & Nobeoka (1998).   
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These findings are broadly consistent with, and supportive of, a growing body of academic 
literature in recent years stressing the importance of evolving collaborative inter-organizational 
knowledge-sharing relationships and learning networks to evolve network-level strategic 
capabilities in an environment where competition between individual firms is being increasingly 
replaced by competition between networks and where suppliers are increasingly emerging as 
important sources of technological innovation.  
 
These recent research-based findings suggest that the basic lean enterprise system (BLES), as 
well as the contemporary lean enterprise system (CLES), contain elements of a “virtuous circle” 
not only for achieving short-term efficiency gains but also for creating long-term dynamic 
network-level organizational capabilities.  
 
3.4   Focus  
The emerging focus on value creation for multiple stakeholders has served as a compass for 
guiding future directions of change in enterprises. Also, the earlier stress on continuous process 
improvement has given way to a new emphasis on enterprise transformation or, more accurately, 
on transforming enterprise business processes, while retaining the earlier concentration on 
operations. Thus, there seems a mismatch between salient intellectual developments, 
underscoring the importance of developing network-level dynamic capabilities, and the 
continuing emphasis on enterprise operations focused on achieving greater efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
Meanwhile, total enterprise boundaries have remained somewhat ambiguous. As a reminder, it 
may be useful to make a distinction between a core enterprise and an extended enterprise. A core 
enterprise refers to a focal, central or nodal enterprise, such as a system-integrator or prime 
contractor (e.g., Toyota, Boeing). It has also been used to refer to a tightly coupled entity, such as 
an integrated core team of companies working together on a major defense acquisition program, 
consisting of the focal enterprise and its work-sharing partners and major subcontractors. An 
extended enterprise encompasses the network of organizations that are clustered around the focal 
or core enterprise -- spanning from lower-tier suppliers to end-use customers -- that are involved 
in the design, development, manufacturing, and lifecycle sustainment of a product or system and 
that are less tightly integrated with the core entity.11 The construct of a networked enterprise has 
been introduced more recently to provide a more unified definition of an enterprise consisting of 
a network of interdependent organizations linked to the core enterprise through tightly coupled or 
loosely coupled relationships. The concept of networked enterprise defines, in effect, the core 
enterprise’s capability space. An important benefit of the networked enterprise concept is that it 
lends itself to a more precise definition using network theory principles.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The concept of an extended enterprise, as defined, is basically the same as the notion of the enterprise 
value stream articulated earlier by Womack & Jones (1996:20-21). A more “bounded” interpretation is 
provided by Dyer (2000:vii,8), where an extended enterprise refers to a set of firms within a value chain or 
production network that have established collaborative relationships, enabling them to work together as an 
integrated team to produce a finished product (e.g., an automobile). Murman et al. (2002:159-162) further 
define enterprises at multiple levels. Examples include a program enterprise (e.g., F-35 Lightning II Joint 
Strike Fighter), a multi-program enterprise (e.g., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., BAE Systems), or a 
national and international enterprise (e.g., European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company – EADS). 
These definitions reflect the prevalent vantage point, where enterprises are viewed through the lens of the 
core, focal or central organization.  
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Despite the rhetoric of value creation for multiple stakeholders and taking a holistic view of 
enterprises, the concept of the end-to-end networked enterprise has been reduced, for all practical 
purposes, to one of value exchanges among many enterprise stakeholders.  
3.5   Implementation 
The implementation of the contemporary lean enterprise system (CLES) principles and practices 
requires a comprehensive approach to improving the performance and capabilities of networked 
enterprises. An integrated set of implementation frameworks, roadmaps, methods and tools that 
have been developed by the Lean Advancement Initiative at MIT (Nightingale 2009) have been 
offered for achieving systemic enterprise change to effect major operational improvements.12 
4     SUMMARY COMPARISON OF THE BASIC AND CONTEMPORARY LEAN 
ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS 
Table 1 provides a summary comparative overview of the two lean enterprise systems capturing 
essential outlines of lean enterprise ideas as they have evolved prior to the mid-1990s as well as 
over the period since the mid-1990s through further research and refinement reflecting 
contemporary developments. Major differences between the basic system and the contemporary 
system can be seen by examining the goal, defining features, core concepts, focus, 
implementation strategy, and mode of change shown in the table. The exclusive customer-centric 
orientation of the earlier system has evolved to embrace a multiple stakeholders view of the 
enterprise, but still retaining a distinct focus on customers. This has led to an emphasis on 
constructing robust value propositions and defining stakeholder value exchanges to help guide 
enterprise strategies and operations.  
Elimination of waste has been replaced with creation of value for multiple enterprise 
stakeholders. The primary emphasis on efficiency has given way to effectiveness before 
efficiency. Virtually total concern with operations and core workflow processes (e.g., product 
development, manufacturing, supply chain management) has been broadened to encompass all 
enterprise functions and processes, even though actual applications of the system have continued 
to emphasize process improvements. The value stream perspective dominating the earlier system 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In summary, the proposed LAI enterprise transformation framework consists of four main elements: (a) 
seven principles of enterprise thinking, as well as a set of overarching concepts related to enterprise 
architecture and architecting to define future-state enterprises; (b) the Enterprise Transformation Roadmap 
tool; (c) the Enterprise Strategic Analysis for Transformation (ESAT) tool; and (d) the Lean Enterprise Self 
Assessment Tool (LESAT). The seven principles, advanced as organizing ideas guiding the transformation 
process, include the following: (1) adopt a holistic approach to enterprise transformation; (2) identify 
relevant stakeholders and determine their value propositions; (3) focus on enterprise effectiveness before 
efficiency; (4) address internal and external enterprise interdependencies; (5) ensure stability and flow 
within and across the enterprise; (6) cultivate leadership to support and drive enterprise behaviors; and  (7) 
emphasize organizational learning. The Enterprise Transformation Roadmap tool maps out a structured, 
closed-feedback-looped, step-wise process consisting of three main decision-action cycles driving both 
short-term and long-term transformation efforts: a front-end strategic cycle, a planning cycle, and an 
execution cycle. The planning cycle is implemented by using the ESAT tool; it is employed to develop an 
understanding of the current state of the enterprise, envision and design the future-state enterprise 
attributes, align the required enterprise infrastructure, and create the transformation plan. The LESAT tool, 
which is a capability maturity self-assessment framework, is employed to gauge the enterprise’s progress 
over time. See Nightingale (2009).  
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has been extended to take a holistic view of the entire networked enterprise, even though here, as 
well, actual applications of the underlying system concepts have fallen far short of such a vision.  
Also, continuous improvement, the centerpiece of the earlier system, has been conceptually 
expanded to emphasize continuous organizational learning and knowledge sharing. The source of 
sustained competitive advantage is no longer found in achieving greater efficiency through 
process improvements but in creating dynamic network-level capabilities. The intervention 
strategy has been broadened from a focal-enterprise-centric approach focused on operational 
improvements to a structured intervention approach to achieving change guided by the creation of 
robust value propositions and definition of value exchanges among multiple enterprises. The aim, 
at least in theory, is to link together the focal enterprise and the rest of the networked enterprise to 
ensure a collaborative win-win change and development process spanning the enterprise network. 
The desired effect is to move away from the lack of any semblance of power equivalence between 
the focal enterprise and its supplier network, in which the focal firm has traditionally exercised 
top-down control of its supporting network, to an enterprise system where all participating 
organizations in the entire network can come together in mutual respect premised on a robust 
value creation framework shared by everyone. Again, actual applications of the contemporary 
lean system have lagged behind these conceptual developments.   
5    CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS  
The lean enterprise system, known earlier principally as just-in-time (JIT) production, kanban, 
lean manufacturing or the Toyota Production System (TPS), was originally developed at Toyota 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s, became fully developed over the postwar decades both at 
Toyota and other Japanese auto companies, came to be recognized in the West as a new and 
fundamentally different production system in the 1980s, and has since been adopted by numerous 
firms in many industries, and by other organizations, to improve performance through continuous 
process improvement as well as through wide-scale planned enterprise change. Its scope and 
content have been expanded significantly since the mid-1990s, reflecting new research and 
learning as its adoption has spread outside the auto industry, particularly into the aerospace 
industry to transform aerospace enterprise operations following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989.  
The lean enterprise system, in its contemporary formulation, provides a holistic view of 
enterprises embodying a tightly-knit set of complementary precepts and practices driving its 
central value-creating operations – product development, manufacturing, supply chain 
management – while optimizing the capabilities and utilization of all people and nurturing a 
culture of continuous organizational learning. Such a holistic conceptual orientation is the result 
of many decades of experience, experimentation and learning at Toyota, which has served as a 
concrete real-world setting. The lean enterprise system embraces the organization and 
management of all enterprise operations at the strategic, tactical, operational levels. It 
conceptualizes the total end-to-end enterprise as an extended enterprise, an interdependent system 
encompassing the entire enterprise value stream encompassing both upstream supplier networks 
and downstream customer-focused activities. It thus takes a network-centric view of the total 
enterprise, organized around the “core” enterprise (e.g., system integrator, prime contractor, lead 
agency), supported by a closely-knit-together web of organizations, technologies, and processes 
branching out and encompassing a multi-tiered supplier network akin to an industrial ecology.  
An important recent advancement in lean enterprise thinking has been a move away from a 
primary emphasis on elimination of waste to creation of value for multiple enterprise 
stakeholders. This has led to an emphasis on constructing robust value propositions and defining 
stakeholder value exchanges to help guide the enterprise’s strategies and operations. Also, a 
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significant shift has taken place from a central focus on pursuing continuous improvement of 
enterprise operations to enterprise transformation, with emphasis on the creation of dynamic 
long-term network-level organizational capabilities. The latter has been enabled by the 
development of integrated product development, manufacturing and supply chain management 
capabilities. The growing importance of building collaborative supplier networks, involving 
extensive knowledge-sharing and inter-organizational learning, reflects the recognition that 
competition between individual firms is being increasingly replaced by competition between 
networks, where suppliers are increasingly emerging as important sources of technological 
innovation.  
Two sets of concluding observations are briefly offered below, the first touching on conceptual 
and practical issues and the second offering future perspectives.  
5.1    Conceptual and practical issues 
In general, the lean enterprise system, in terms of its earlier, formative, evolution, represents a 
practice-based, rather than a theory-grounded, enterprise management system. That is, its 
formative development has been basically atheoretical (i.e., lacking a firm theoretical 
foundation), as well as acontextual (i.e., lacking a formal conceptual articulation of the specific 
external environmental contingency conditions under which it is most effective or where it may 
be found largely ineffective). A number of main concepts or propositions, such as the construct of 
the value stream and the notion of a stakeholder-centric enterprise, remain ambiguous or 
incomplete. While the value stream concept has been useful for identifying and eliminating waste 
at the level of individual products, it is unwieldy at the level of complex large-scale enterprises 
with multiple products, each involving hundreds if not thousands of suppliers across the globe. 
Also, it is often employed as if the organizations along a given value stream behave like iron 
filings around a magnet – as a mechanical, control-oriented approach, defying real-life 
complexities. Similarly, the stakeholder-centric enterprise concept is framed in a rather simplistic 
manner, ignoring conflicts among stakeholders in terms of their value expectations or time 
preferences. Theoretical issues pertaining to aggregation of individual utility functions to derive 
group or social welfare functions, already addressed in the economics literature over many 
decades, has received scant attention. Also, despite some efforts to provide insights into the 
dynamics of network-level organizational learning and creation of dynamic capabilities, almost 
exclusive emphasis has continued to be placed on enterprise operations and process improvement. 
This has left an important void in terms of developing an improved understanding of the 
dynamics of technological innovation in lean enterprises to ensure sustained long-term 
competitive advantage. 
Further, the lean enterprise system neglects contingency conditions by assuming a relatively 
stable or fixed external environment that is predictable and controllable, which essentially defines 
the boundary conditions within which it is most effective. A related issue concerns the general 
neglect of demand variability, although it could be argued that demand-leveling is a useful way of 
cushioning or protecting the system, based on a sound rationale, against external perturbations 
such as spikes in demand. In any event, as a general matter, lack of an explicit account of 
contingency conditions raises a basic question about the viability of the lean enterprise system 
under market conditions characterized by high-velocity change, hyperturbulence and uncertainty. 
An inherent risk is that of conceptualizing modern enterprises essentially as if they were closed-
systems, something abandoned in the literature in the 1960s, forcing simple, linear, predictable 
and controllable cause-effect relationships.  
Moreover, whether the lean enterprise system basically represents an approach for achieving 
continuous process improvement or strategic enterprise change and transformation through 
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planned intervention remains an open question, where the theoretical evidence seems to favor the 
former rather than the latter. Meanwhile, the concept of transformation remains conceptually 
ambiguous, even in the face of the fact it has been the subject of considerable theoretical attention 
in the organization science literature.   
Other aspects or dimensions of the lean enterprise system have also come under some criticism. 
For example, Hines, Holwe & Rich (2004:998-1000) draw attention, among others, to its “lack of 
human integration” (e.g., exploitative and high pressure working conditions on the shop floor), 
“limited applicability outside high-volume repetitive manufacturing environments,” “fuzzy 
boundaries,” and “lack of strategic perspective.” Going forward, these issues invite greater 
cognizance of human dimensions of lean implementation, potential limits of lean practices, and 
the importance of taking a strategic holistic perspective to avoid getting trapped in narrow tactical 
or operational thinking. Application of lean concepts in the aerospace industry, involving the 
design and building of extremely low-volume systems as well as low-volume high-mix 
production, does not support the notion that the usefulness of the lean enterprise system is limited 
only to high-volume repetitive manufacturing environments. The lack of a holistic strategic 
perspective has severely limited lean implementation in the aerospace industry (see, for example, 
Crute, Ward, Brown & Graves 2003). The point about the “fuzzy boundaries” has been an on-
going issue, largely as a function of the evolving nature of lean enterprise thinking, and requires 
greater attention to core issues of theory construction and relevance.   
“How to become more like Toyota” by learning from Toyota, and from other organizations 
emulating Toyota, has dominated the research agenda, at the cost of evolving testable 
propositions, a prerequisite for construction of sound theory. Also, abstracting over many decades 
from the successful experience of Toyota serving as an exemplar company, despite its benefits, 
may not have been an unmixed blessing. Seeking implicit or explicit validation by reference to 
Toyota may have created a tendency to idealize observed practices and overlook certain pitfalls, 
blind spots or shortcomings, rather than reviewing them critically from a larger theoretical 
perspective.  
Further, two main issues pertaining to the implementation of the lean enterprise system should be 
noted. The first involves the tension between incremental change, driving continuous 
improvement, and enterprise transformation, which involves radical, discontinuous or 
revolutionary change. The basic question is whether incremental change is capable of delivering 
enterprise transformation. The theoretical evidence on this question seems to be essentially 
negative, since continuous improvement, through incremental change, represents a convergent 
process, where incremental change only further refines and reinforces the existing system or 
paradigm. In contrast, transformation, through radical or disruptive change, represents a divergent 
process, a sharp break with the past.  
Viewing lean enterprise concepts as a tight constellation of mutually supportive and reinforcing 
principles and practices (i.e., as an integral, indecomposable system) suggests that, to derive the 
full benefits of lean ideas, individual enterprise elements cannot be improved piecemeal or 
changed selectively in isolation from the others. Moreover, the adoption of lean enterprise 
principles, starting from an initial state of a traditional mass production or batch-and-queue type 
operational system, requires radical or deep change in the first instance, sweeping the entire 
enterprise, not incremental change, where continuous improvement through incremental change 
should come after, not before, such radical change. These observations run contrary to the 
common approach of selectively grafting lean principles and practices into an enterprise’s 
existing culture, structure and management system through a series of incremental change 
initiatives, while basically ignoring other lean enterprise principles, in the misplaced hope that 
this will enable enterprise transformation.  
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The second issue entails whether the dominant planned change approach – which represents a 
top-down, lockstep, linear, sequential, programmatic, control-oriented process – is the appropriate 
or effective approach to change management and, perhaps more importantly, whether it, in fact, 
represents the right lessons learned from the evolution of lean enterprise principles and practices. 
On both accounts, the answer seems negative. The planned change model, employed to 
implement the lean enterprise system to achieve large-scale enterprise change and transformation, 
has come under increasing criticism over the past twenty years for its fundamental flaws in 
addressing the considerable complexity of organizational change processes and time-dynamics 
beyond certain threshold complexity levels. Enterprises, as complex systems, exhibit nonlinear 
interactions, multilevel nested complexity, and strong emergent properties, where the behavior or 
outcome at a higher level cannot be predicted with confidence by observing detailed structure and 
behavior at a lower level, nor can the multi-level reverberations of top-down actions can be fully 
anticipated, directed or controlled.    
The implementation of lean enterprise concepts and practices, often bundled together with six 
sigma methods and elements of other approaches, has generally been targeted at achieving 
continuous improvement at the tactical and operational levels, revealing a serious gap at the 
strategic level. As a result, there have been numerous individual cases of tangible and even 
significant operational improvements achieved in both industry and government organizations. 
These gains have been reflected in terms of lower costs, shorter lead times, higher quality, and 
increased customer satisfaction. However, the realized benefits have been visible mostly in the 
form of “islands of success,” (Murman et al. 2002:114-116), usually confined to particular 
programs, processes or functions, and have been rather short lived. Also, the implementation 
efforts have seemed to favor control of existing processes rather than further experimentation, 
learning, and innovation, leading to new processes and products.  
These implementation-related issues require a fundamental re-evaluation of current planned 
change approaches and force to center stage a fresh re-examination of Toyota’s evolution over 
time through experimentation, learning and adaptation. Ohno, the father of lean production, did 
not create a perfectly rational and complete production system after a long day’s reflection. The 
lean enterprise system has evolved and matured over many decades, involving quite a few 
setbacks. However, this evolutionary real-world experience seems to have been “packaged” or 
reduced, by both academic researchers and practitioners, without a cogent rationale, into a 
deterministic and largely mechanical prescriptive formula for achieving change using a top-down, 
structured, control-oriented implementation approach. The efforts focused on “becoming more 
like Toyota” seem to have extracted the wrong lessons from Toyota’s own history. A correct 
reading of the past, already well documented, suggests that today’s planned change initiatives to 
turn existing enterprises into lean enterprises by engineering large-scale enterprise 
transformation, if they wish to achieve more than marginal benefits, should take cognizance of 
the limits of deterministic thinking and action. They should allow for ample room for emergent 
change to take hold and flourish, as a way of addressing the complex dynamics of enterprise 
change.   
Important recent conceptual progress has been made in terms of moving away from an almost 
exclusive emphasis on largely descriptive “how-to” practices to embrace a broader set of precepts 
more closely in tune with contemporary mainstream organization theory, particularly in terms of 
developing the organizational capacity for learning and creation of dynamic network-level 
capabilities. At its current level of conceptual development, the capacity of the lean enterprise 
system -- as a viable framework for explaining the structure and dynamics of modern networked 
enterprises, for managing complex enterprises, and for improving their performance either 
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through continuous process improvement or through wide-scale planned change and 
transformation -- remains a work-in-progress.   
5.2     Future perspectives 
The lean enterprise system has been widely adopted by aerospace enterprises and other 
organizations since the early 1990s to achieve significant efficiency gains in operational 
performance. Both the new affordability imperative in aerospace and, more broadly, a major shift 
in management philosophy and practice following the dissolution of the dominant mass 
production system, forced a central emphasis on process management and continuous 
improvement. The ground has shifted since then, however, and enterprises no longer compete 
based on process management and continuous improvement. They must instead create dynamic 
long-term capabilities, establish inter-organizational networks fostering learning, knowledge-
creation and innovation, and evolve adaptive and reconfigurable network architectures to thrive 
under varying external environmental conditions characterized by increasing complexity, high-
velocity change and uncertainty. Accordingly, there is an opportunity to build upon and expand 
the integrated review and synthesis of the lean enterprise system presented in this chapter by 
pursuing a robust research agenda in the future designed to help strengthen its conceptual 
properties and practical usefulness. An important starting point is to address the types of issues 
highlighted above and, more generally, to integrate lean enterprise principles and practices more 
closely with the evolving mainstream organization theory and practice.  
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Table 1: Summary comparative overview of the key dimensions of the basic lean enterprise system (BLES) and the contemporary lean enterprise 
system (CLES)  
          Lean System                                 
Key  
Characteristics 	   Basic Lean Enterprise System  (BLES)   Contemporary Lean Enterprise System  (CLES)   History Since late 1940s; documented mostly in late-1970s to mid-1990s period Since the mid-1990s  
Goal • Deliver value to customers 
• Increase production efficiency and profitability  
• Create and deliver value to multiple enterprise stakeholders 
• Build dynamic network-wide capabilities for sustained competitive advantage 
 Core Principles • Ensure long-term thinking, stability and constancy of purpose 
• Focus on the customer to deliver customer-pulled value 
• Take an end-to-end value stream view of the enterprise  
• Eliminate waste 
• Create just-in-time (JIT) production system 
• Strive for perfect quality 
• Achieve stability and continuous flow 
• Pursue continuous improvement 
• Enhance the capabilities of all people  
• Establish long-term relationships based on mutual trust and commitment 
 
• Adopt a holistic view of the end-to-end networked enterprise 
• Cultivate leadership stressing long-term thinking, stability and constancy of purpose 
• Construct robust value propositions and define value exchanges among stakeholders 
• Eliminate waste with the goal of delivering customer-pulled value to multiple enterprise 
stakeholders 
• Ensure synchronized flow throughout the networked enterprise  
• Foster a culture of continuous improvement and learning towards the creation of long-term 
dynamic network-wide capabilities 
• Develop collaborative relationships and mutually beneficial governance mechanisms  
• Evolve an efficient, flexible and adaptive networked enterprise 
 
 
 
Focus • Core enterprise operations & workflow processes  
• End-to-end value stream of the core enterprise 
• Collaborative relationships throughout the value stream 
 
• Entire enterprise value stream (core enterprise, upstream supplier networks, downstream 
activities linking core enterprise to end-use customers)  
• Enterprise operations at all scales (strategic, tactical, operational) 
• Leadership processes, core business processes (product development, production, 
sustainment, supply chain management), and supporting infrastructure processes (e.g., 
human resources, customer services, information systems, contracting) 
• Value exchanges among all enterprise stakeholders 
• Managing both internal and external interdependencies  
Implementation    • Value -- specify value as defined by the end customer 
• Value stream -- identify the value stream to eliminate all  
non-value-adding activities 
• Flow -- make the value adding steps for the specific products flow 
continuously 
• Pull -- let the customers pull value from the enterprise 
• Perfection – pursue perfection through continuous improvement. 
Source: Womack & Jones (1996) 
• Pursue enterprise transformation by adopting a holistic enterprise perspective, lean 
enterprise principles, conceptual frameworks, methods and tools  
• Plan and implement enterprise transformation by pursuing a structured process containing, 
for example, the following major building-block steps:   
 Initiate strategic preparedness and learning cycle (e.g., define strategic imperatives, 
engage leadership in transformation); 
 Develop enterprise transformation plan (e.g., define enterprise, understand current state, 
create future state vision, develop strategic & detailed implementation plan); 
 Create required infrastructure systems & capabilities (e.g., enabling policies, metrics, 
information systems, incentive mechanisms, training of change agents) 
 Execute transformation plan (e.g., identify, prioritize, initiate & coordinate  
high-potential projects) 
 Monitor progress, take corrective action and institutionalize systemic change process. 
 
Source: Draws on Nightingale (2009) Mode of Change  
• Continuous incremental change  • Systemic evolutionary change  
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